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### 1

#### Cuba’s a persistent human rights violator-reject the aff with the moral duty to shunning

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A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### 2

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is trending upwards – it’s key to CCP export markets and energy imports

Myers and Hongbo 13 (Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue, Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, each answering a question from the Inter-American Dialogue “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)

A: Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue: "Latin America became a strategically important market for Chinese exporters a few years ago following decreases in demand for Chinese goods from Europe and the United States. Chinese exports to Europe fell 9 percent in 2011 in comparison with export levels in 2010, for example, and exports to the United States fell 5 percent. As U.S. and European demand continues to lag, Latin American nations should expect sustained interest in their markets and new market- and efficiency-seeking investments. As China continues its process of industrial upgrading, Latin America will also see more in the way of high-tech goods, as well as marketing of distinctly Chinese brands. Chinese cars are already being sold in several Latin American countries, including Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. And Chinese cell phones and computers are increasingly popular among Latin American consumers. As the former LAC director general at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yang is uniquely familiar with both the promises and pitfalls of trade with Latin America. While Latin America remains an appealing market for exports, Chinese producers and officials are painfully aware of growing protectionism in response to China's market-seeking endeavors. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences cited nationalization and trade protectionism trends among the top 20 notable events in the region in 2012. China expects to avoid protectionist measures by building mutually beneficial, 'win-win' trade relations. Chinese government and commercial entities in Latin America will indeed be working to build stronger trade relations in the coming years." A: Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: "China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."

#### Bolstering US influence pushes China out – Columbia proves it determines contracts

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### China’s exports are key to a sustainable economy – recent shocks mean it’s on the brink

Holland 7/9 (Tom, writer of the South China Morning Post’s Monitor column, internally citing statistics from ADBI, the Asian Development Bank Institute, Dr. Yuqing Xing, professor of economics an director of Asian economic policy at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, PhD in economics from the University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign, MA and BA from Peking University, South China Morning Post Monitor, July 9, 2013, “Despite rebalancing, exports still vitally important to China,” <http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1278239/despite-rebalancing-exports-still-vitally-important-china>, alp)

Unfortunately, the figure for gross exports isn't much use either. In an economy where all the value of all exports was produced domestically, then gross exports would give a good idea of external demand. But real supply chains don't work like that. Chinese factories import flash memory chips from Japan, displays from Korea and processors from the United States, which they then assemble into smartphones for sale around the world. So although the face value of China's exports may be high, the value added by China's factories is often relatively low. But although gross exports aren't much help in gauging the true importance of external demand, net exports don't work either. If all China's imports were components destined for re-export, the net figure would do the trick. But they aren't. Imports are also consumed domestically, not least by Chinese buying their own smartphones. To estimate the real contribution of external demand, we would have to account for the proportion of China's imports destined for re-export after assembly. Although these processing imports have fallen relative to China's total imports over recent years, as the first chart shows, they still make up a sizeable share of China's overall inbound goods trade. In an attempt to do exactly that, Xing Yuqing and Manisha Pradhananga at the Asian Development Bank Institute have come up with a measure of external demand which strips out China's processing imports. Then, for good measure, they have factored in an allowance for foreign direct investment into China, which remains driven largely by external, rather than domestic, demand. They found that although the share of external demand in China's GDP has fallen from its high of 28 per cent reached in 2007, in 2011 it still accounted for 22 per cent of overall economic output. As the second chart shows, that's 10 times as great as the share implied by the net export figure commonly used by economists. Xing and Pradhananga conclude that despite efforts to rebalance the economy towards domestic consumption, China is still heavily dependent on demand from the rest of the world, and that its growth remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. In other words, if tomorrow's trade numbers are as dismal as many analysts expect, it will be an ominous sign indeed for China's growth outlook.

#### Chinese economic decline goes global and causes nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 – professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

## 3

#### US is taking a firm stance against Cuba and will not lift the embargo

Kovalik and Lamrani, 6/28 - Senior Associate General Counsel of the United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO (USW), Dr. Lamrani, lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée University and French journalist, specialist on relations between Cuba and the US, (Daniel and Salmi, “Trying to Destroy The Danger of a Good Example The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba” 6/28, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/> )//RG

Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts.¶ Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting[asserts]:¶ Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cuba’s economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island.¶ The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade. He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place.¶ In addition, we must support Venezuela and its new President, Nicolas Maduro, as Venezuela has been quite critical in supporting Cuba in its international medical mission. And indeed, one of the first things President Maduro did once elected in April was to travel to Cuba to reaffirm his support for these efforts. It should be noted that Maduro’s electoral rival, Henrique Capriles – who led an attack against the Cuban Embassy in Caracas during the 2002 coup — vowed to end support for, and joint work, with Cuba.

#### Engagement with Cuba is appeasement and solves nothing

Rubin, 2011 - Labor Law Attorney and Washington Post Journalist (Jennifer, “Obama’s Cuba appeasement”, Washington Post, 8/18, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html> )//RG

The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: “According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn’t try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.”

As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didn’t stop there. The [Associated Press](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-14/cuba-imprisoned-american-swap/50767012/1?csp=34news)reported, “The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross’ release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States.”

Former deputy national security adviser [Elliott Abrams explained](http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2011/10/14/trading-away-cuba-policy/#more-2032), “It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime.”

The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same.

Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States.

Whether it is Cuba or [Iran,](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/280214/iran-dangerous-and-diplomacy-has-failed-jamie-m-fly) the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.

#### Appeasement ruins American credibility—encourages resistance to US policy

Rock 2k—professor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A., Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 (Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 4)//BJ

It does so in either (or both) or two ways. First, by ceding strategically valuable territory or abandoning certain of its defenses, the appeaser allows the military balance to shift in favor of the potential aggressor, eroding the former’s deterrent capacity. This might be called the “material effect” of appeasement. Thus, for example, the abandonment of formidable Czech defenses in 1938 at Munich and the loss of the Czech Army in March of 1939 shifted the military balance toward Germany and rendered her attack on Poland more likely to succeed. ¶ Second, and much more critical, is what one can term the “psychological effect” of appeasement. Specifically, it is argued that appeasement gravely weakens the credibility of deterrent threats. Once it has received inducements, the adversary refuses to accept the possibility that the government of the conciliatory state will later stand firm. It thus advances new and more far-reaching demands. When the government of the appeasing state responds to these demands by issuing a deterrent threat, it is not believe. Ultimately, deterrence fails, and the appeasing state must go to war if it wishes to defend its interests. The real tragedy of Munich, from this perspective, was not that Anglo-French concessions failed to satisfy Hitler in September of 1938—although that was bad enough—but that they encouraged him to attack Poland a year later, in blatant disregard of warnings from London and Paris that they would intervene.

#### Decline in U.S. Credibility Undermines U.S. Hegemony

APSA 09 (American Political Science Association, “U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future”, Task Force Report, September 2009)

As at the regional level, U.S. standing on the global stage appears susceptible to both vicious and virtuous cycles resulting in valleys and peaks, declines and advances. As credibility and esteem decline, the United States may be less able to lead and accomplish its policy goals. Others will be less willing to follow a U.S. lead or defer to U.S. opinions because they no longer believe the United States will get the job done, honor promises, or offer a desirable model to emulate. This, in turn, may further diminish U.S. standing. We see some evidence of this in the most recent period of diminished U.S. standing in global institutions. Logically, however, the converse ought to be true as well. As the United States is perceived to honor promises and show interest in multilateral leadership, its standing may be expected to increase, which may make expanded leadership, increased authority and cooperation possible. We suspect, however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it.

#### Heg solves nuclear war – empirics prove

Lewis 09—Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009,(James, “The blessings of Pax Americana,” <http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/09/the_blessings_of_pax_americana.html>)//BJ

The American Non-Empire --- what kind of "empire" is this, anyway? --- is far and away the best cop in world history, bringing the longest period of world peace (since 1948), the widest spread of freedom and democracy, the freest economies ever known, and as a direct result, the greatest world-wide prosperity from China to Brazil. Yes, we've seen horrific tyrannies and wars since 1948 --- but they have been local. No repeat of the Thirty Year War, of the Napoleonic mass wars, 1848, 1878, 1914, 1932, and in spite of decades of Cold War, no imperial expansion by Stalin and Mao Zedong. The Cold War stayed cold, a damned good thing. The Europeans have turned their armies into welfare programs. We were invited to rescue them when the Balkans blew up during the Clinton years. The Middle East is always on a low boil, but it never blows up. (So far.) The same goes for Asia. Koreans still hate Japan because of the horrific actions of the Japanese armies in World War Two. So do the Chinese. But they haven't come to blows. They understand that they are benefiting from the Good Cop of Pax Americana. Just let the US Navy withdraw from Asia and watch the Japanese getting a nuclear bomb, the Chinese invading Taiwan, and a new age of armed alliances emerging. Democratic governance only spread in Asia after the US victory over Japan. Before that it was tried by Sun Yat Sen and failed. Who would you like to be guarding the world instead of the United States? The UN? China or Russia? Europe? Well, let them call the UN Human Rights Commission the next time they have a problem. (That would be Iran, the Sudan, and Libya.) For sixty years the troubles have been kept local and regional. That is an unprecedented achievement for the United States. Those facts are all around us. Everybody knows it -- our allies, fake allies, enemies and friends. It's hard to tell who's who, but every time they get a choice between American leadership and anything else, they choose us. Then they go home and bitch about it. It's either Pax Americana, nuclear war, or tyranny.

### 4

#### Lifting the embargo would force liberalization upon Cuba, destroy its domestic industries, and integrate it into the global neoliberal order.

**Gonzalez, law prof, 3** (Carmen, Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law, Tulane Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, p. 685, 2003, “Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba”, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987944>, ZBurdette)

Notwithstanding these problems, the greatest challenge to the agricultural development strategy adopted by the Cuban government in the aftermath of the Special Period is likely to be external—the renewal of trade relations with the United States. From the colonial era through the beginning of the Special Period, economic development in Cuba has been constrained by Cuba’s relationship with a series of primary trading partners. Cuba’s export-oriented sugar monoculture and its reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs was imposed by the Spanish colonizers, reinforced by the United States, and maintained during the Soviet era.410 It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the strengthening of the U.S. embargo that Cuba was able to embark upon a radically different development path.

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415

It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418

Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation.

The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### They make all life disposable—turns their framework argument

Giroux 8 [Henry, PROF. OF CULTURAL STUDIES AND COMMUNICATION AT MCMASTER UNIVERSITY, “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age” Social Identities, September, 2008, CMR]

Needless to say, invoking hope must be connected to a version of biopolitics in which life meaningful, purposeful and dignified life, not simply bare life is both affirmed and made central to the challenge of addressing the problem of disposability as global in its roots and transformation. This suggests a political pedagogy in which injustices on a local level are linked to broader global forces, and a notion of public responsibility in which matters of human waste and disposability are ‘condemned not because a law is broken, but because people have been hurt’ (Simon, 2005, p. 117). In a market-driven society in which disposability is now central to modes of regulation, growth, and power, the price that is being paid in human costs is so high as to potentially spell the eventual destruction of the planet itself. At the same time, the return of Gilded Age excess with its biopolitics of wealth, greed, and gross inequality reveals its link to a historical past in which the rich squander valuable resources and remove themselves from the violence, loss, pain and death visited daily on billions of people on the planet. The return of the Gilded Age must be viewed not as historical reinvention, but as a referent for critique and collective struggles for democracy. Just as suffering can no longer be treated as either routine or commonsensical, the New Gilded Age and its institutional formations, values, corruptions, and greed must be rewritten in the discourse of moral outrage, economic justice, and organized resistance. Against the apocalyptic ‘dream-worlds’ of neoliberalism, educators and others need to find new ways to rebuild those deserted public spheres from the schools to the media to cyberspace where it becomes possible to produce the conditions in which individual empowerment is connected not only to the acquisition of knowledge and skills, but also to social power (Bauman, 2005, p. 124). In an age marked by outsourcing, uncertainty, deregulation, privatization, and downsizing, hope is in short supply because many people have little sense of a different future, or of what it means to seek justice collectively rather than individually, relying on their own meagre resources to combat problems that far exceed individual solutions. As shared fears, insecurities, and uncertainties replace shared responsibilities, those who bear the effects of negative globalization and neoliberalism increasingly retreat into the narrowly circumscribed worlds of either consumerism or the daily routines of struggling to survive. Ignorance, indifference, and apathy provide the conditions for political inaction and the atrophy of democratic politics.

#### Vote neg to interrogate neoliberal economic engagement with latin America from the starting point of knowledge production.

**Walsh, Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2012**

(Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of

### 1NC – Soft balancing turn

#### Shows of good faith won’t create trust

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 142

Finally, just because the United States is a democracy doesn't mean that others won't fear its hegemonic power. When important geopolitical interests are on the line, realpolitik, not regime type, determines great power policies. The fact that U.S. power is unbalanced—and that Washington is so little constrained—means that, whenever it believes its interests dictate, the United States can throw the purported constrictures of democratic benevolence out the window and act as hegemon typically have acted. Indeed, since the end of the cold war, the nature, and scope, of America's hegemonic ambitions have become increasingly apparent even to its liberal democratic allies. The post cold war policies of the United States have caused other states to have second thoughts about whether it really is a status quo power. And the fact that the United States is a democratic hegemon does nothing to cause nondemocratic states (either second-tier major powers or lesser-ranking regional powers) to regard the United States as a benevolent hegemon.

#### Regionalism’s coming now – solves the impact to multilat

Krishnan Srinivasan, "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century," THE ROUND TABLE v. 98 n. 400, 2009, pp. 37-47.

The new world order of the ﬁrst half of the present century will be one of peaceful mutual accommodation between the big powers located in the East and West, North and South. The priority for these powers will be for economic progress and regional order, with defence expenditure being used to build technological capacity for deterrence against the other big powers and as an enabler for their self-appointed but globally recognized role as regional enforcers. In this neo-Hobbesian world system, the lesser states will come to their own bilateral arrangements with the local regional hegemon upon whom they will be dependent not only for their security but for economic, technical and trading facilitation. Some of these lesser entities will enjoy economic prosperity, depending on their ability to maintain internal cohesion, to turn globalization to their advantage, and to control the socio-economic consequences of climate change, but they will not be able to mount a challenge to the hierarchical nature of international society. They will have far greater recourse to the United Nations than the major powers, who will prefer to apply unilateral methods with the connivance and consent of their peers. The debate between Westphalian national sovereignty and the right to intervene to breach the sovereignty of other states on the grounds of preventing threats to international peace and security will not be resolved. Political and economic inequality between nations will be drawn in ever sharper focus. Regional institutions will be dominated by the local big power. Reform of the United Nations will be incomplete and unappealing to the vast majority of member states. The world’s hegemonic powers will lose faith in the Security Council as an effective mechanism to deliberate issues of peace and security. World bodies will be used for discussion of global issues such as the environment and climate change, pandemic disease, energy and food supplies, and development, but resulting action will primarily devolve on the big powers in the affected regions. This will particularly be the case in the realm of peace and security in which only the regional hegemon will have the means, the will and the obligation, for the sake of its own status and security, to ensure resolution or retribution as each case may demand. Even in a globalized world, regional and local action will be the prime necessity and such action will be left to the power best equipped to understand the particular circumstances, select the appropriate remedy and execute the action required to administer it. Conﬂict will be contained and localized. There will be no menace of war on a world-wide scale and little fear of international terrorism. Private-enterprise terrorist actions will continue to manifest political, social and economic frustrations, but they will be parochial, ineffective and not state-sponsored. There will be far less invocation of human rights in international politics, since these will be identiﬁed with a western agenda and western civilization: there will be an equal recognition of community rights and societal values associated with Eastern and other traditions. Chinese artists, Indian entrepreneurs, Russian actors, Iranian chefs, South African song-writers and Brazilian designers will be household names; models on the fashion cat-walk and sporting teams from all major countries will be distinctly multi-racial, reﬂecting the immigration to, but also the purchasing power of, the new major powers. National populations will show evidence of mixed race more than ever before in history. Climate change will be an acknowledged global challenge and all countries, led by the regional hegemons, will undertake binding restraints on carbon emissions. The world will become acutely conscious of the essentiality of access to fresh water. The pace of technological innovation will accelerate at dizzying speed, further accentuating inequalities. There will be very rapid steps taken to develop alternative sources of energy in the face of dwindling and costly oil supplies. Western industrialized nations, to remain competitive, will vacate vast areas of traditional manufacturing in favour of new technologies and green engineering. The world will be a safer and stable place until one of the hegemons eventually develops an obvious ascendancy ﬁrst regionally, then continentally and ﬁnally globally over all the others.

#### And legitimacy failure preserves the trend towards regionalism – shows of American good faith only result in soft-balancing

Michael J. Mazarr, Professor, National Security Strategy, U.S. National War College, "The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency," WASHINGTON QUARTERLY v. 35 n. 4, Fall 2012, p. 14-15.

Diplomacy increasingly fails. A parallel risk has to do with the ebbing force of U.S. diplomacy and influence. International power is grounded in legitimacy, and in many ways it is precisely the legitimacy of the leading power’s global posture that is under assault as its posture comes into question. Historically, rising challengers gradually stop respecting the hegemon’s right to lead, and they begin to make choices on behalf of the international community, in part due to strategies consciously designed to frustrate the leading power’s designs. Germany, under Bismarck and after, is one example: It aspired to unification and to its ‘‘rightful place’’ as a leading European power as its power and influence accumulated, its willingness to accept the inherent legitimacy of the existing order as defined by other states, and the validity and force of their security paradigms, declined proportionately. At nearly all points in this trajectory, German leaders did not seek to depose the international system, but to crowd into its leadership ranks, to mute the voices of others relative to its own influence, and to modify rather than abolish rules.¶ We begin to see this pattern today with regard to many emerging powers, but especially of course, China’s posture toward the United States.31 As was predicted and expected in the post-Cold War context of growing regional power centers, the legitimacy of a system dominated by the United States is coming under increasing challenge. More states (and, increasingly, non-state actors) want to share in setting rules and norms and dictating outcomes.¶ The obvious and inevitable result has been to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. While measuring the relative success of a major power’s diplomacy over time is a chancy business (and while Washington continues to have success on many fronts), the current trajectory is producing a global system much less subject to the power of U.S. diplomacy and other forms of influence. Harvard’s Stephen Walt catalogues the enormous strengths of the U.S. position during and after the Cold War, and compares that to recent evidence of the emerging limits of U.S. power. Such evidence includes Turkey’s unwillingness to support U.S. deployments in Iraq, the failure to impose U.S. will or order in Iraq or Afghanistan, failures of nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran, the Arab Spring’s challenges to long-standing U.S. client rulers, and more.32 As emerging powers become more focused on their own interests and goals, their domestic dynamics will become ever more self-directed and less subject to manipulation from Washington, a trend evident in a number of major recent elections.¶ Washington will still enjoy substantial influence, and many states will welcome (openly or grudgingly) a U.S. leadership role. But without revising the U.S. posture, the gap between U.S. ambitions and capabilities will only grow. Continually trying to do too much will create more risk of demands unmet, requests unfulfilled, and a growing sense of the absurdity of the U.S. posture. Such a course risks crisis and conflict. Similarly, doubt in the threats and promises underpinning an unviable U.S. security posture risks conflict: U.S. officials will press into situations assuming that their diplomacy will be capable of achieving certain outcomes and will make demands and lay out ultimatums on that basis only to find that their influence cannot achieve the desired goals, and they must escalate to harsher measures. The alternative is to shift to a lesser role with more limited ambitions and more sustainable legitimacy.

#### The plan won’t lead to effective multilateralism

Ana Palacio, a former Spanish foreign minister and former senior vice president of the World Bank, is a member of the Spanish Council of State, “The U.S. suffers from strategic blindness”, 11-7-13, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2013/Nov-07/237017-the-us-suffers-from-strategic-blindness.ashx#ixzz2kNblgrQo>, CMR

That is all the more true given that the nature of such problems has also changed. America, like the rest of us, is vulnerable to climate change, pandemics and terrorism – challenges that require coordinated global solutions. For the U.S., however, the utility of multilateralism is purely situational. Above all, multilateralism is never preferable to a “good” bilateral solution – a view that has reinforced behavior that undermines, rather than strengthens, the capacity for effective international action. Indeed, always ready to negotiate treaties but rarely prepared to sign – and even less likely to ratify – them, the U.S. remains absent from such key global agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Its inspired creativity and support in building formal institutions like the United Nations and World Bank has given way to a predilection for weak, informal and ad hoc groupings, such as the various G-somethings and “coalitions of the willing.” Establishing effective multilateralism requires an emphasis on rules and institutions that facilitate coordination. The recent decision by the U.S. to sign the Arms Trade Treaty could be a good start – if only Congress could marshal the bipartisan support needed to ratify it. But scattered moves in the right direction will not suffice. What is really needed is a change in vision and mentality – a shift from viewing multilateralism as a tactic to embracing it as a strategic imperative.

### 1NC – AT: Multilat (domestic PTX)

#### Domestic politics tank implementation

Held 13, David Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham AND Thomas Hale, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University AND Kevin Young, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 5/24/13, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” <http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation>, CMR

The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common.¶ Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems---indeed it is---but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries.

### 1NC – AT: Multilat (international gridlock)

#### Multilat can’t be pragmatically implemented

Holmes 10 — VP, foreign policy and defense studies, Heritage. Frmr Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Member of the CFR. Frmr adjunct prof of history, Georgetown. PhD in history, Georgetown (Kim, Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations, 21 Sept. 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations, AMiles)

The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Yet only rarely do all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to address it. At times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course of action. Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other confrontational measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the number and intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught with political challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to other problems. For the United States, multilateralism faces its greatest challenge at the United Nations, where U.S. diplomats seek cooperative action among member nations on serious international problems. Therein lies the tension. The United Nations is first and foremost a political body made up of 192 states that rarely agree on any one issue. Even fundamental issues, such as protecting and observing human rights, a key purpose of the U.N. that all member states pledge to uphold when they join it, have become matters of intense debate. A key reason for this difficulty is the fact that the voices and votes of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have equal weight to those of free nations at the U.N. The all-too-frequent clash of worldviews between liberty and authoritarian socialism has stymied multilateralism more than facilitated it, frequently leading to institutional paralysis when a unified response to grave threats to peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms was needed. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who attended the San Francisco meetings that established the U.N., acknowledged this Achilles’ heel in 1954, when he told reporters: “The United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good.”[1] Fifty-five years later, the ideological fray at the U.N. has turned the terms “democracy” and “freedom” on their heads. Autocracies that deny democratic liberties at home are all too keen to call the Security Council “undemocratic” because in their view not every region, country, or bloc is sufficiently represented. During my time at the State Department, I was told repeatedly by other diplomats at the U.N. that the very concept of “freedom” is taboo because the term is “too ideologically charged.” In this environment, how can the United States or any freedom-loving country advance the purposes set forth in the U.N. Charter, including “encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all,”[2] when the word “freedom” itself is considered too controversial? More money will not do it. No other nation contributes more to the U.N.’s regular budget, its peacekeeping budget, or the budgets of its myriad affiliated organizations and activities than the United States. America has continued its generous support even though Americans increasingly view the U.N. as inefficient and ineffective at best and fraudulent, wasteful, anti-American, and beyond reform at worst.[3] If the United States is to advance its many interests in the world, it needs to pursue multilateral diplomacy in a smarter, more pragmatic manner. This is especially true when Washington is considering actions taken through the United Nations. A decision to engage multilaterally should meet two criteria: First, it should be in America’s interests, and second, it will serve to advance liberty. Unless the United States can achieve both these ends acting within the U.N. system, it should find ways to work around it. Such “smart multilateralism” is not easy, particularly in multilateral settings. It requires politically savvy leaders who can overcome decades-old bureaucratic inertia at the State Department and in international organizations. It requires the political will and diplomatic skill of people who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests in difficult environments, especially where progress will likely be slow and incremental. It requires a belief in the cause of liberty, gleaned from a thorough study of our nation’s history and the U.S. Constitution, and a deep appreciation for the values and principles that have made America great. Smart multilateralism requires a fundamental awareness of the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and failings, of the U.N. and other multilateral negotiating forums, so that the United States does not overreach. Perhaps the most critical decision is whether or not to take a matter to the U.N. in the first place. It would be better to restrict U.S. engagement at the U.N. to situations in which success is possible or engagement will strengthen America’s influence and reputation. Selective engagement increases the potential for success, and success breeds success. When America is perceived to be a skillful and judicious multilateral player, it finds it easier to press its case. Smart multilateralism thus requires well-formulated and clear policy positions and a willingness to hold countries accountable when their votes do not align with our interests. Finally, smart multilateralism is not the same thing as “smart power,” a term that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has used. Suzanne Nossell, a former diplomat at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, coined that term in 2004 and described it in an article in Foreign Affairs.[4] Smart power is seen as a takeoff of “soft power,” which suggests that America’s leaders downplay the nation’s military might as well as its historic role in establishing an international system based on the values of liberty and democracy, and de-emphasize its immense economic and military (“hard”) power. Smart power seeks to persuade other countries from a position of assumed equality among nations. This assumption has become the Achilles’ heel of the U.N. system and other Cold War–era organizations. Smart multilateralism does not make that same mistake. Challenges to Effective U.S. Multilateralism The United States belongs to dozens of multilateral organizations, from large and well-known organizations such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund to relatively small niche organizations such as the Universal Postal Union and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. The 2009 congressional budget justification[5] for the U.S. Department of State included line items for U.S. contributions to some fifty distinct international organizations and budgets.[6] The United Nations and its affiliated bodies receive the lion’s share of these contributions. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund weight voting based on contributions, most of these organizations subscribe to the notion of the equality of nations’ votes. With a few exceptions such as Taiwan,[7] all nations—no matter how small or large, free or repressed, rich or poor—have a seat at the U.N. table. Every nation’s vote is equal, despite great differences in geographic size, population, military or economic power, and financial contributions. This one-country, one-vote principle makes the U.N. an extremely difficult venue in which to wage successful multilateral diplomacy. In this environment, multilateralism becomes a double-edged sword. It can sometimes speed up global responses to global problems, as with the avian flu outbreak and the Asian tsunami. At other times, it can slow or prevent timely responses, as with halting Iran’s nuclear weapons program and stopping genocide in Darfur. Too often, multilateralism at the U.N. is the political means by which other countries and regional blocs constrain or block action. Groups of small nations can join together to outvote the great powers on key issues, and this situation can often lead to bizarre outcomes and compromises. Even seemingly noncontroversial issues, such as improving auditing of U.N. expenditures, require days of skillful, almost nonstop negotiations. The U.N. is simply too poorly primed for American multilateralism. It is a vast labyrinth of agencies, offices, committees, commissions, programs, and funds, often with overlapping and duplicative missions.[8] Lines of accountability and responsibility for specific issues or efforts are complex, confused, and often indecipherable. For example, dozens of U.N. bodies focus on development, the environment, and children’s and women’s issues. Coordination is minimal. Reliable means to assess the effectiveness of the bodies’ independent activities is practically nonexistent. Although institutional fiefdoms and bureaucratic interests strongly influence the formulation of U.N. policy, programs, and resolutions, the most powerful actors remain the member states. Each tries to persuade the U.N. as an institution to advocate and adopt its positions on the matters most important to it. The chaos of conflicting priorities rarely results in consensus for decisive action. The most common result is inaction or a lowest-common-denominator outcome. Too often, the United States also finds that other countries’ positions on an issue have been predetermined in their regional or political groupings. These groupings include the European Union; the G-77, or Group of 77 (which is really a caucus of some 130 countries, including China, Iran, and Cuba); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the African Union (AU); the Arab League; and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Some countries participate in several of these blocs. Added to this mix is heavy lobbying by “civil society” special interest groups, especially on contentious causes, which helps to explain why the United States faces an uphill battle in successfully husbanding any policy proposal through the U.N. system. Perhaps the most stunning example came under President Bill Clinton, when the United States was trying to negotiate changes to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), so that the United States could sign it. Intense lobbying by nongovernmental organizations at the proceedings culminated in dramatic cheering when 120 countries voted in favor of the statute despite U.S. objections.[9] Of course, the most difficult forum for negotiating multilateral solutions is the Security Council, where the most serious security matters are raised and the greatest failures of multilateralism have occurred. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union largely shut down the council with its veto. As a result, the United States conducted most of its international affairs outside of the U.N., yet very few complaints of unilateralism were heard. That changed when the Soviet Union dissolved, and the hope was that the U.N. would at last become a force for good in the world. Instead, new rivalries have emerged that undermine its effectiveness. Perhaps the most frustrating development for U.S. multilateralism at the U.N. in the post–Cold War era has been the inability of the United States to develop a shared position with some of its best friends in Europe. Often, the allies say that they cannot negotiate with the United States until the European Union has taken a “common European position.” Yet after that common position has been adopted, individual European countries claim far less flexibility to negotiate. The EU also has been known to strong-arm its allies as well as its member states to oppose U.S. positions. For example, on the issue of genocide in Darfur, I witnessed the EU’s most visible leaders pressing the United States to accept the ICC as the international judicial authority to try war crimes committed in Sudan, rather than setting up an ad hoc tribunal. Furthermore, they leaned on Romania to go along with their position, even threatening Romania with punitive action if it did not. Countries hostile to the United States and to economic and political freedoms can and do take full advantage of this crack in the West’s once-unified front. Sometimes, though, the United States is its own worst enemy. Intense interagency discussions must take place before the State Department sends out any instruction cable to its negotiators at the U.N. and diplomats in capitals. Such delays can be costly because they give other countries time to sway votes against the U.S. position, leaving U.S. negotiators with little time to convince others to change their minds. For U.S. negotiators, this process can blur not only the clarity of purpose, but also policy objectives. Even after the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council hammer out a policy, U.S. diplomats are sometimes simply unable to advance it. Many who are fairly new to the negotiations must deal with counterparts from other countries who have worked the same issue in international settings for years. Some U.S. diplomats would rather settle for consensus than work for an outcome in which the U.S. will be isolated and which places America alongside pariah states such as Zimbabwe or Sudan, even if those countries voted with the United States for starkly different reasons.

### Ag

**Warming inevitable**

**Dickinson 9** (Pete, Global warming: Is it too late?, 26 August 2009, http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article19.php?id=1142, AMiles)

Note – paper cited is by Susan Solomon - atmospheric chemist working for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration - Gian-Kasper Plattnerb- Group, Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics, UCLA - Reto Knuttic - Institute for Atmopsheric and Climate Science, PhD

New research is claiming that concentrations of carbon dioxide (the main greenhouse gas, CO2) will remain high for at least 1,000 years, even if greenhouse gases are eliminated in the next few decades. The climate scientists who produced this work assert that the effects of global warming, such as high sea levels and reduced rainfall in certain areas, will also persist over this time scale. (The findings are in a paper published in February in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences by researchers from the USA, Switzerland and France, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0812721106 ) Most previous estimates of the longevity of global warming effects, after greenhouse gases were removed, have ranged from a few decades to a century, so this new analysis could represent a development with very serious implications, including political ones. For example, those campaigning for action on climate change could be disheartened and climate sceptics could opportunistically say that nothing should be done because it is now too late. The authors of the paper make various estimates of CO2 concentrations based on the year emissions are cut, assumed to be from 2015 to 2050. They make optimistic assumptions, for instance, that emissions are cut at a stroke rather than gradually, and that their annual rate of growth before cut-off is 2%, not the 3% plus witnessed from 2000-05. They then estimate what the effects would be on surface warming, sea level rise and rainfall over a 1,000-year period using the latest climate models. The results of the melting of the polar ice caps are not included in the calculations of sea levels, only the expansion of the water in the oceans caused by the surface temperature increase so, as the authors point out, the actual new sea level will be much higher. The best-case results for surface warming, where action is taken in 2015 to eliminate emissions, show that over 1,000 years the temperature rises from 1.3 to 1.0 degree centigrade above pre-industrial levels. The worst case, where action is delayed to 2050, predicts surface temperatures will increase from just under to just over four degrees by 2320 and then remain approximately constant for the rest of the millennium. High levels of CO2 persist in the atmosphere because, over long timescales, reduction of the gas is dependent on the ability of the oceans to absorb it, but there are limits to this due to the physics and chemistry of deep-ocean mixing. On the other hand, the amount of heat in the atmosphere that can be absorbed by the sea, the key way surface temperatures are decreased, is limited by the same scientific laws. As a result, carbon concentrations cannot fall enough to force temperatures down while there is simultaneously reduced cooling due to limited heat loss to the oceans.

**No impact to warming**

**Lomborg 8**—Director - Copenhagen Consensus Center Adjunct prof, Copenhagen Business School. (Björn, Warming warnings get overheated, 15 August 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange, AMiles)

Much of the global warming debate is perhaps best described as a constant outbidding by frantic campaigners, producing a barrage of ever-more scary scenarios in an attempt to get the public to accept their civilisation-changing proposals. Unfortunately, the general public – while concerned about the environment – is distinctly unwilling to support questionable solutions with costs running into tens of trillions of pounds. Predictably, this makes the campaigners reach for even more outlandish scares. These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" and the beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world's coastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland – "undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

**US can’t solve warming**

**Sensenbrenner 9** – Congressman and ranking minority member of the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming (James, 4/3, Technology Is the Answer to Climate Change, WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123871985916184973.html#mod=loomia?loomia\_si=t0:a16:g2:r3:c0.191864:b23626456, AG)

The U.S. cannot reduce the growth of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere without the developing nations cutting their emissions as well. A 2007 study by the Battelle Memorial Institute found that if China, India and the other developing countries keep growing at current rates, they will emit nearly three times as much carbon dioxide as will the developed countries by the end of this century. But will China and India join in the effort to reduce CO2 emissions? During December's U.N. climate-change conference in Poznan, Poland, I asked delegates from both of these nations if they would agree to cut their emissions. Both said, unequivocally, "no." The Poznan conference wasn't my first experience with the developing world's refusal to sign up for the West's global-warming agenda. I led the congressional delegation to the infamous Kyoto, Japan, negotiations in 1997, and the story then was the same as now. Without China and India, there can be no deal. It's understandable why the developing nations are reluctant to cut emissions -- it means higher energy costs and reduced growth. China and India are more concerned with growing their economy, expanding access to electricity, and reducing poverty. I don't blame them.

**Alt causes**

**Ecobridge 7** (http://www.ecobridge.org/content/g\_cse.htm, AG)

While carbon dioxide is the principal greenhouse gas, methane is second most important. According to the IPCC, Methane is more than 20 times as effective as CO2 at trapping heat in the atmosphere. US Emissions Inventory 2004 Levels of atmospheric methane have risen 145% in the last 100 years. [18] Methane is derived from sources such as rice paddies, bovine flatulence, bacteria in bogs and fossil fuel production. Most of the world’s rice, and all of the rice in the United States, is grown on flooded fields. When fields are flooded, anaerobic conditions develop and the organic matter in the soil decomposes, releasing CH4 to the atmosphere, primarily through the rice plants. US Emissions Inventory 2004 Water Vapor in the Atmosphere Increasing Water vapor is the most prevalent and most poweful greenhouse gas on the planet, but its increasing presence is the result of warming caused by carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases. (See NOAA's National Climate Data Center (NCDC) FAQ page) Water vapor holds onto two-thirds of the heat trapped by all the greenhouse gases.[129] As the Earth heats up relative humidity is able to increase, allowing the planet's atmosphere to hold more water vapor, causing even more warming, thus a positive feedback scenario. Because the air is warmer, the relative humidity can be higher (in essence, the air is able to 'hold' more water when its warmer), leading to more water vapor in the atmosphere, says the NCDC. There is much scientific uncertainty as to the degree this feedback loop causes increased warming, inasmuch as the water vapor also causes increased cloud formation, which in turn reflects heat back out into space. Nitrous oxide Another greenhouse gas is Nitrous oxide (N2O), a colourless, non-flammable gas with a sweetish odour, commonly known as "laughing gas", and sometimes used as an anaesthetic. Nitrous oxide is naturally produced by oceans and rainforests. Man-made sources of nitrous oxide include nylon and nitric acid production, the use of fertilisers in agriculture, cars with catalytic converters and the burning of organic matter. Nitrous oxide is broken down in the atmosphere by chemical reactions that involve sunlight. Deforestation After carbon emissions caused by humans, deforestation is the second principle cause of atmospheric carbn dioxide. (NASA Web Site) Deforestation is responsible for 20-25% of all carbon emissions entering the atmosphere, by the burning and cutting of about 34 million acres of trees each year. We are losing millions of acres of rainforests each year, the equivalent in area to the size of Italy. [22] The destroying of tropical forests alone is throwing hundreds of millions of tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year. We are also losing temperate forests. The temperate forests of the world account for an absorption rate of 2 billion tons of carbon annually. [3] In the temperate forests of Siberia alone, the earth is losing 10 million acres per year.

**No brink—hundreds of species have gone extinct by now and they don’t stop all species loss**

**Species loss alt causes**

**EDF 7** (Environmental Defense Fund, The Importance of Wildlife and the Diversity of Life, http://www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=445, AG)

The major cause of species loss in the U.S. and worldwide is the loss and degradation of habitat. As forests, wetlands, prairies, coastal estuaries and other habitats are converted to residential, commercial or agricultural use and other types of development, wild plants and animals vanish. In addition, many areas known as "hotspots" for their unusually rich biodiversity, such as Florida and Southern California, also have rapidly expanding human populations, which accelerates the loss of biodiversity. In the U.S. non-native species are the second largest cause of species loss. Hundreds of Hawaii's unique wildlife and plants are being driven to extinction by non-native plants and animals. Other factors are pollution, disease, over-fishing and over-hunting.

**No extinction**

**Easterbrook** **3—**senior fellow at the New Republic(“We're All Gonna Die!”, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

**Environment resilient—adaptation checks**

**Doremus 2k** – Law Professor, California (Holly, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, AG)

Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 [\*47] One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse. n217

**Tech solves—their evidence is media alarmism—the environment is improving**

**Stossel**, **7** Journalist, winner of the Peabody Award, anchors ABC News, [John, “Environmental Alarmists Have It Backwards”, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/how\_about\_economic\_progress\_da.html]

Watching the media coverage, you'd think that the earth was in imminent danger -- that human life itself was on the verge of extinction. Technology is fingered as the perp. Nothing could be further from the truth. John Semmens of Arizona's Laissez Faire Institute points out that Earth Day misses an important point. In the April issue of The Freeman magazine, Semmens says the environmental movement overlooks how hospitable the earth has become -- thanks to technology. "The environmental alarmists have it backwards. If anything imperils the earth it is ignorant obstruction of science and progress. ... That technology provides the best option for serving human wants and conserving the environment should be evident in the progress made in environmental improvement in the United States. Virtually every measure shows that pollution is headed downward and that nature is making a comeback." (Carbon dioxide excepted, if it is really a pollutant.) Semmens describes his visit to historic Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts, an area "lush with trees and greenery." It wasn't always that way. In 1775, the land was cleared so it could be farmed. Today, technology makes farmers so efficient that only a fraction of the land is needed to produce much more food. As a result, "Massachusetts farmland has been allowed to revert back to forest." Human ingenuity and technology not only raised living standards, but also restored environmental amenities. How about a day to celebrate that? Yet, Semmens writes, the environmental movement is skeptical about technology and is attracted to three dubious principles: sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and stakeholder participation. The point of sustainable development, Semmens says, "is to minimize the use of nonrenewable natural resources so there will be more left for future generations." Sounds sensible -- who is for "unsustainable" development? But as the great economist Julian Simon often pointed out, resources are manmade, not natural. Jed Clampett cheered when he found oil on his land because it made him rich enough to move to Beverly Hills. But his great-grandfather would have cursed the disgusting black gunk because Canadian geologist Abraham Gesner hadn't yet discovered that kerosene could be distilled from it. President Bush chides us for our "addiction to oil." But under current conditions, using oil makes perfect sense. Someday, if we let the free market operate, someone will find an energy source that works better than oil. Then richer future generations won't need oil. So why deprive ourselves and make ourselves poorer with needless regulation now? Anyway, it's not as if we're running out of oil. That's one of the myths I expose in my new book, "Myths, Lies and Downright Stupidity". If the price of a barrel of oil stays high, entrepreneurs will find better ways to suck oil out of the ground. At $50 a barrel, it's even profitable to recover oil that's stuck in the tar sands in Alberta, Canada. Those tar sands alone contain enough oil to meet our needs for a hundred years. The precautionary principle, popular in Europe, is the idea that no new thing should be permitted until it has been proved harmless. Sounds good, except as Ron Bailey of Reason writes, it basically means, "Don't ever do anything for the first time." Stakeholder participation means that busybodies would be permitted to intrude on private transactions. Semmens's example is DDT, which for years would have saved children from deadly malaria, except that "'stakeholders' from the environmental quarter have prevailed on governments to ban the trade in this product." The first victims of these principles are the poor. We rich Westerners can withstand a lot of policy foolishness. But people in the developing world live on the edge, so anything that retards economic progress -- including measures to arrest global warming -- will bring incredible hardship to the most vulnerable on the planet. If we care about human life, we should celebrate Economic Progress Day.

# 2nc

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:20)

#### The CCP has meticulously planned Chinese growth to account for slowdowns, but they require exports to buttress their economy – declining demand in the US and Europe forces them to Latin America – that’s Holland.

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#### Exports are key to the economy – downturn collapses the CCP’s hold on power which causes nuclear lashout and global draw-in. That outweighs on magnitude. CCP irrationality and the perceptive nature of the internal link mean we win timeframe: you can only die once.

#### Independently, they conceded the economy impact in the Buzan and Foot ev – Chinese slowdown collapses global growth which turns the case:

### 2NC – CCP collapse (0:30)

#### **Internal instability causes CCP desperation and war over Taiwan**

Lewis 8 [Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,” World Finance, 5/13, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html]

In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China’s expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

#### That escalates

Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper) August 3, 2005, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death” <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html>)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

### 2NC – Turns Cuban ag

#### Chinese sustainable ag solves and turns modeling

Scoones, 8

(Stephen, Project Manager at Shanghai Scoones Agriculture Information Consulting Co Ltd, 5/2008, EU-China Trade Project, “Organic Agriculture in China: Current Situation and Challenges”, <http://www.eu-china.net/web/cms/upload/pdf/materialien/EUCTP%20A0171%20Organic%20Food%20Report%20EN_09-10-16.pdf>, AMP)

China has established a large organic agriculture industry in a short period starting only in 1990. Its development has been underpinned by some well suited production locations with low pest and disease pressure and for labour intensive crops, by China’s traditional agriculture system. However, China needs to overcome the poor image and credibility of its organic agriculture, which the field investigations found were, in most cases, not justified. China needs to take leadership in demonstrating to its international trading partners and its domestic consumer population the competence of its organic agriculture and credibility of its regulatory regime, through transparent regulation and industry information that is easily available to the public. The recent and rapid development of China’s organic agriculture: its standards, operation and regulation, leave opportunities for improvement. The investigation showed strong developing competence in the industry and its regulators as they rapidly gain technical and management experience.

#### Cooperation with Cuba’s key

SIP Press Release, 7/18

(Scoop Independent News, 7/18/13, “China and Cuba to Advance Cooperation in Agriculture”, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1306/S00449/china-and-cuba-to-advance-cooperation-in-agriculture.htm>, AMP)

China and Cuba expressed their interest in keeping advancing bilateral cooperation in agriculture, innovation and scientific exchange, official sources reported on Saturday. The issue was addressed by Cuban Agriculture minister Gustavo Rodriguez during a meeting in Beijing with his Chinese counterpart Han Changfu. The Chinese government official recalled a recent visit to Cuba in which he met with the historic leaders of the Cuban Revolution and he stressed the importance of implementing a cooperation program signed by the two Agriculture ministries during the visit to China by President Raul Castro last year. The two parties agreed that although some actions have been taken on the basis of the accord, there is mutual interest in the advancement of that program. Minister Han Changfu also expressed his willingness to further increase scientific and technical exchange and innovation in the industrial and agriculture sectors. The two agriculture ministers exchanged views on the measures being implemented by the Cuban government in the sector. The Cuban official briefed his host about the transformations that are underway in the area as part of the update of the island’s economic sector.

### 2NC – Turns warming coop

#### China solves warming coop – BRICs prove

Mingde 12 [Zhang Mingde, professor of diplomatic policy at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in ChinaMuch in Common, Americas Quarterly: Winter 2012: Volume 0: Issue 0, http://www.ciaonet.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/journals/aq/aq1054/05.html // Accessed: July 11th 2013]

China and Latin America may be distant geographically, but they share a long history of friendship and common challenges. Both are at similar stages of development, and both seek more development. As our economies grow closer, we are pursuing even greater opportunities for mutual understanding and closer cooperation. The Chinese government views its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean strategically, and from this perspective it is seeking to build a comprehensive and cooperative partnership of equality, mutual benefit and common development. The past decade has witnessed dramatic progress in China-Latin America relations. What began as primarily a trade relationship-in which two-way trade has grown exponentially-has developed into a multifaceted relationship. Exchanges of high-level visitors occur regularly. China has established strategic partnerships with Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela. Communication between China and Latin America has expanded dialogue and exchanges at all levels of government. New channels have opened for people-to-people exchanges. And many countries now collaborate in multilateral institutions and forums. China and Latin America share common or similar positions on many issues. China and the emerging powers in Latin America now consult, coordinate and collaborate well in many formal and informal multilateral forums like the grouping of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries, the G20, the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, and the UN Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development. These pragmatic trade and economic relationships have not only consolidated political relations; they have brought tangible benefit to the well-being of both peoples.

### Impact turn

#### Chinese arms sales are irrelevant:

#### 1) Minor military initiatives

Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)>

Since the granting of port concessions in Panama to the Hong-Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa in 1999, Chinese military engagement with Latin America has been one of the most broadly discussed, but misunderstood, dimensions of PRC activities in the region.2 The PRC’s military initiatives in Latin America are arguably not the largest or most strategically significant part of its rapidly expanding interac- tions with the region. Nor do they visibly threaten the United States or undermine pro-Western regimes in the same fashion as Soviet military engagement with Latin America during the Cold War. The initiatives, however, are significant and growing, and continue to be a key to the evaluation by U.S. decisionmakers as to whether the Chinese presence in Latin America constitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.

#### 2) PRC won’t be overt

Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)>

In general, as this section has suggested, the course taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin America in the medium or long term is likely to differ significantly from that witnessed with respect to Soviet military activities in the region during the Cold War. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain from overtly provocative activities, such as the establish- ment of bases with a significant Chinese presence, overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrow a regime, unilateral military intervention in the region in a contested leadership situation, or participation in anti-US military alliances.

#### Economic incentives mean no deliberate war

Jenkins, 10 – Professor of International Development at the University of East Anglia (Rhys, “China’s Global Expansion and Latin America”, Cambridge Journals, 2010, <http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)//KG>

China’s main objectives in Latin America are to obtain secure sources of raw materials and market access for its manufactured goods. It therefore has an interest in continuing economic and political stability in the region, and would not want to undermine this through a confrontation with the United States. Populist nationalism in Latin America, although historically directed against the United States, could also adversely aﬀect Chinese interests in the region. The Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, for example, expressed concerns over the implications for his country’s oil interests of institutional uncertainties created by the revision of the country’s constitution and bilateral investment agreements.66 Another factor that inﬂuences China’s policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations with Latin America or any individual Latin American country, both economically and politically.67 As a result, China’s policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological. Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of diﬀerent political hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identiﬁed closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by President Cha´vez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with which it has important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.

### 2NC – Soft balancing turn (overview)

#### Regionalism is emerging as the outlet for international cooperation – the US will exercise a more limited role and devolve the resolution of international problems to regional powers – that’s Srinivasan. This is vastly more effective than multilateral approaches which makes it offense for us – we’re link turning their multilat advantage:

#### a) Regional powers can tailor solutions based on their neighborhood’s unique political conditions. Multilateral one-size-fits-all solutions are diluted by aggressive outsiders and partisanship.

#### b) Multilateralism creates opportunities for countries to soft-balance the US which hamstrings cooperation. American primacy is structurally unsustainable because of rising powers – the US will exercise a limited role in regional institutions, but won’t run the world stage. 1NC Mazzar indicates rising powers want to “frustrate the leading power’s design” – multilateral approaches give countries like North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela the incentive and capability to disrupt perceived US “meddling” because multilateral deliberation is “one country, one vote.” The US will inevitably overreach and get slammed when it brings up climate talks or nonproliferation at the UN but can approach those issues seriously in more exclusive negotiations.

#### CX of the 1AC proves – they say we need to reclaim our role as the “good guy nation,” but who cares – the countries from whom we need cooperation won’t cooperate anyway. Lifting the embargo won’t change Iranian or North Korean foreign policy – we deal with those problems via regionalism anyway which is terminal impact defense. The P5+1 and the success of Iran’s nuclear negotiations prove we don’t need “friends” or multilateral institutions to succeed politically.

#### Their Dickerson ev makes a sweeping claim about resolving other problems, but there’s not a single empirical example that supports the success of this kind of grand agenda – the world order is rigged against the US which makes multilateralism nice in theory but ineffective in practice. Multilateralism isn’t an impact, it’s a problem solving mechanism – until they convince you that it’s effective, it’s better to not try since we control uniqueness.

#### We spec link their warming impact – Srinivsasan indicates

Climate change will be an acknowledged global challenge and all countries, led by the regional hegemons, will undertake binding restraints on carbon emissions. The world will become acutely conscious of the essentiality of access to fresh water. The pace of technological innovation will accelerate at dizzying speed, further accentuating inequalities. There will be very rapid steps taken to develop alternative sources of energy in the face of dwindling and costly oil supplies. Western industrialized nations, to remain competitive, will vacate vast areas of traditional manufacturing in favour of new technologies and green engineering. The world will be a safer and stable place until one of the hegemons eventually develops an obvious ascendancy ﬁrst regionally, then continentally and ﬁnally globally over all the others.

#### Every multilat conference has failed though…

### 2NC – Ext. hard power alt cause

#### Hard power forces militarily weak nations to soft-balance which breaks down consensus and collapses effective multilateralism – that’s Layne.

#### It overshadows the aff’s benevolent signal

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 68

Doubtless, American primacy has its dimension of benevolence, but a state as powerful as the United States can never be benevolent enough to offset the fear that other states have of its unchecked power. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there is no such animal. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them—and for good reason. In today's world, others dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical weight in America's favor and the purposes for which it may be used. After all,"Nogreat power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a greatdeal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such bythem. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, butthey are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by theexistence of countervailing power and the possibility of it being exercised." While Washington's self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of American power is tangible. Others must worry constantly that ifU.S. intentions change, bad things may happen to them. In a one-superpower world, the overconcentration of power in America's hands is an omnipresent challenge to other states's ecurity, and Washington's ability to reassure others of its benevolence is limited by the very enormity of its power.

#### Channels of multilateralism can only limit power

Robert A. Pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “Soft Balancing Against the United States” International Security

Traditional realists may be tempted to dismiss soft balancing as ineffective. They should not. In the long run, soft balancing could also shift relative power between major powers and the United States and lay the groundwork to enable hard balancing if the major powers come to believe this is necessary. Preventing Soft Balancing in the Future The Bush strategy of preventive war against rogue states and aggressive unilateral military policies in general are increasing the incentives for major powers to balance against the United States. Since 2002, scholars, journalists, and diplomats have witnessed the result: a profound change in the world's response to American power. They have seen not simply the reluctance of traditional allies to join the U.S. war effort against Iraq, but active efforts by many of the world's major powers to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. war plans and reduce the number of countries that would fight alongside the United States. Although some observers might have thought that major powers would easily mend fences with the United States after the conquest of Iraq, in fact there are signs of growing soft balancing against it. Perhaps the most important indicator concerns U.S. allies. Key countries that sided with the United States during the war are working with France and Germany in a manner that works against further U.S. military adventures. Following the March 2004 election, Spain's newly elected prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, declared, "I want Europe to see us again as pro-European. The war in Iraq has been a disaster and the occupation continues to be a great disaster. Spain is going to see eye to eye with Europe again. Spain is going to be more pro-Europe than ever." n67 In September 2003 the United Kingdom joined France and Germany in an effort independent of the United States to use diplomacy and economic statecraft to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear ambitions. In February 2005 these European efforts compelled the Bush administration to declare that it would not use force against Iran "at this point in time" and to support a multilateral approach to the issue, at least temporarily.n68 Such widespread opposition is virtually unprecedented in U.S. history, especially by European and other major powers allied with the United States since World War II. The world is pushing back in response to the Bush administration's strategy of aggressive unilateralism. For the first time, the United States has adopted a national strategy to conquer countries that are not attacking it or its allies, at a time of its choosing, whether other states agree with U.S. policies or not. That Iraq and most other announced possible targets of this preventive war strategy are important to the control of Persian Gulf oil only makes matters worse. That the Bush strategy simultaneously calls for other aggressive unilateral military policies that will increase U.S. nuclear advantages over major powers indicates the administration's lack of concern about a backlash from these states. Serious opposition to U.S. military policies is only likely to increase if the United States continues along its present course of aggressive unilateralism. Traditional hard balancing -- military buildups, war-fighting alliances, and transfers of military technology to U.S. opponents -- may not occur soon in today's world, dominated as it is by the United States' overwhelming military power. But states can dilute the U.S. advantage and contain the United States' power in other ways. Even without directly confronting U.S. military might, major powers can use soft balancing tools -- international institutions, economic statecraft, and ad hoc diplomatic arrangements -- to limit the use of U.S. power in the short term and establish the crucial conditions for more ambitious balancing efforts in the long term.

#### Rising states will “leash slip” despite offered olive branches

Christoper Layne Fall, 2006 “The Unipolar Illussion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment” International Security 31.2 (2006) 7-41

The United States' hard power poses a nonexistential (or soft) threat to others' autonomy and interests. By acquiring the capability to act independent of the United States in the realm of security, however, other states can slip free of the hegemon's leash-like grip and gain the leverage needed to compel the [End Page 29] United States to respect their foreign policy interests. As Posen writes, other major states are expected "at a minimum [to] act to buffer themselves against the caprices of the U.S. and will try to carve out the ability to act autonomously should it become necessary." 81 Leash-slipping is not traditional hard balancing because it is not explicitly directed at countering an existential U.S. threat. At the same time, it is a form of insurance against a hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a predatory and menacing fashion. 82 As Robert Art puts it, a state adopting a leash-slipping strategy "does not fear an increased threat to its physical security from another rising state; rather it is concerned about the adverse effects of that state's rise on its general position, both political and economic, in the international arena. This concern also may, but need not, include a worry that the rising state could cause security problems in the future, although not necessarily war." 83 If successful, leash-slipping would result in the creation of new poles of power in the international system, thereby restoring multipolarity and bringing U.S. hegemony to an end.

### 2NC – Ext. soft balancing I/L

#### Their internal link takes foreign cooperation for granted – instead, 1NC Mazarr indicates small states will consciously undercut US programs via soft-balancing. Their legitimacy scenario might take shape but won’t produce a durable impact.

#### Their ev doesn’t assume the turn – prefer newest, broadest studies

Chaka Ferguson, Florida International University, 3-28-2011. “Soft Power as the New Norm: How the Chinese- Russian Strategic Partnership (Soft) Balances American Hegemony in an Era of Unipolarity,” <http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1449&context=etd>

Analytically, the study has sought to develop a robust definition and methodological framework to determine whether soft balancing is occurring in a specific instance. The definition provided in this study has gone further than those found in the existing literature by rethinking norms as a capability.519 Re-conceptualizing norms (or soft power) along these lines distinguishes hard balancing from soft balancing. Instead of trying to increase relative strength through internal arms buildups or alliances, states faced with overwhelming hard power can develop and increase their soft power assets to restrain a superpower. Such a strategy is much more cost effective than costly internal balancing and less perilous than risky alliances. Furthermore, soft balancing is unlikely to draw the “focused enmity” of the reigning hegemon, which reduces the potential for defections. For these reasons, soft balancing (whether acknowledged or not by the balancers) is the ideal strategy for states that are not currently worried about physical attack by a hegemonic power, but rather are looking for ways to counter the objectives and preferences of the hegemon. Making hard and soft balancing analytically distinct also will help policymakers and scholars avoid possible misperception in international politics. Because of its indirect nature, soft balancing could easily be overlooked. In fact, some scholars argue that there is little or no evidence for the concept. I argue the opposite and demonstrate the necessity of analytically distinguishing between hard and soft balancing. If soft and hard forms of balancing are not kept distinct, there is the possibility of misinterpretation of behavior. For example, actions by China and Russia to counterbalance norms might be underestimated and dismissed because they are indirect and therefore difficult to perceive or quantify. On the other hand, conflating all forms of balancing into the traditional variety could lead to an overestimation of Chinese and Russian motives and capabilities, leading to unnecessary confrontation, escalating tensions and spiraling security dilemmas.

#### Consensus-based models empower weaker states to exploit US commitments and undermine American initiatives

Daniel Pitcairn · November 2012. “Public Opinion and Soft Balancing within the Transatlantic Alliance,” YALE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, <http://yris.yira.org/essays/830>

The better argument for why one should look within international institutions to find evidence of soft balancing derives from Ikenberry’s theoretical explanation for institutionalizing power when a state becomes the leading power in the aftermath of a major war. Ikenberry argues that, after achieving victory in World War II and persuasively becoming the leading state in the international system, the United States engaged in a revolutionary process of institutionalizing its power and values within the Bretton Woods institutions, the UN, NATO, etc. While a hegemon would normally want to bind other states to rules and institutions while remaining free itself, Ikenberry explains that in current conditions, “to get the willing participation and compliance of other states, the leading state must offer to limit its own autonomy and ability to exercise power arbitrarily” within institutions.[3] The other or secondary states have a strong interest in complying and participating because they fear domination by unbridled hegemonic power; international institutions reduce this threat. On the other side of the equation, a leading state like the United States has a strong interest in constraining itself within the institutions and rules it establishes in order to obtain the compliance and participation of secondary states because doing so conserves American power. Ikenberry argues, “the creation of basic ordering institutions is a form of hegemonic investment in the future. If the right types of rules and institutions become entrenched, they can continue to work in favor of the leading state even as its relative material capabilities decline.”[4] However, secondary states are particularly likely to soft balance against the US within international institutions because such institutions artificially increase their power relative to that of the United States. For example, NATO requires consensus among member states for significant strategic decisions, meaning that relatively weaker states like Belgium and Luxembourg are greatly empowered. By voluntarily constraining itself within international institutions, the United States empowered secondary states to counter or constrain (i.e. soft balance) US initiatives.

# 1nr

### K

**Something is stirring in the hearts of the oppressed!**

**Kritik outweighs and turns the case…**

**a. market militarization** – under the guise of profit-driven neoliberalism, globalization causes one-sided wealth distribution exacerbating global inequality and instability which breed irrationality and civil conflicts which escalate – makes interstate wars inevitable, that’s Makwana

**b. collapses economic engagement –** Latin American countries empirically backlash against state interventions based off a historically deprived record of US actions in the region – turns the entire AFF, that’s Makwana

**c. obliterates value to life – outweighs extinction**

**Giroux 08 –** McMaster cultural studies professor (Henry, “Beyond the bio politics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age”, Social Identities; Sep2008, Vol. 14 Issue 5, p587-620, ebsco)

Any attempt to address the current bio politics of neoliberalism and disposability must begin by decoupling what has become a powerful hegemonic element in neoliberal rationality the presupposition that the market is synonymous with democracy and the final stage in ‘the telos of history’ (Davis, 2008). Against this ideological subterfuge, it is crucial for intellectuals and others not only to reveal neoliberalism as a historical and social construction, but also to make clear the various ways in which its regime of truth and power is being resisted by other countries, particularly as ‘its magic seems to have faded in the laboratories of the south, especially in Latin America, where once Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador were crowded together as its poster children’ (Martin, 2007, p. 20). Equally important is the necessity to make visible and critically analyze the matrix of ideological and economic mechanisms at work under neoliberalism and how the latter are producing a growing inequality of wealth and power throughout the globe. And, yet, revealing the underlying material relations of power, institutions, and political rationality at work in the bio politics of neoliberalism while important is not enough. What must also be addressed in resisting the bio politics of neoliberalism is its concerted assault on the very possibility of politics, democracy, and the educational conditions that make them possible. Central to such a challenge is the necessity to address how neoliberalism as a pedagogical practice and a public pedagogy operating in diverse sites has succeeded in reproducing in the social order a kind of thoughtlessness, a social amnesia of sorts, that makes it possible for people to look away as an increasing number of individuals and groups are made **disposable**, relegated to new zones of exclusion marked by the presupposition that life is cheap, if not irrelevant, next to the needs of the marketplace and biocapital. Of course, there is more at stake here than providing a genealogy of neoliberal economics, politics, and hegemony, there is also, as Zygmunt Bauman (2004, 2005, 2006) has pointed out, a need to situate the bio politics of neoliberalism within a growing economy of individuation and privatization, the current collapse of the social state, the transfer of power to larger global political forces, the death of long term projects that embrace a democratic future, and a dissolution of all democratic social forms. Under the reign of neoliberalism and its rabid market fundamentalism, society is no longer protected by the state. As neoliberalism reproduces with deadly results the multi-leveled economies of wealth and power, it also decouples economics from public life and morality from market forces, and in doing so creates with little opposition endless numbers of disposable populations who are stripped of their most basic rights and relegated to the axis of irrelevance. As Bauman (2006) points out, against the most basic principles of a viable democracy, neoliberalism produces disposable populations that are now not only considered ‘untouchables, but unthinkables’. He writes: In the habitual terms in which human identities are narrated, they are ineffable. They are Jacques Derrida’s ‘undecidables’ made flesh. Among people like us, praised by others and priding ourselves on arts of reflection and self-reflection, they are not only untouchables, but unthinkables. In a world filled to the brim with imagined communities, they are the unimaginables. And it is by refusing them the right to be imagined that the others, assembled in genuine hoping to become genuine communities, seek credibility for their own labours of imagination. (pp. 4546) This logic of disposability is about more than the extreme examples portrayed by the inhabitants of Agamben’s camp. The bio politics of disposability both includes and reaches beyond the shocking image of the overcrowded refugee camps and the new American Gulag that includes the massive incarceration mostly people of color, special prisons for immigrants, torture sites such as Abu Ghraib, and the now infamous Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Disposable populations now include the 60 million people in the United States living one notch about the poverty line, the growing number of families living on bare government subsistence, the 46 million Americans without health insurance, the over 2,000,000 persons incarcerated in prisons, the young people laboring under enormous debt and rightly sensing that the American dream is on life support, the workers who are one paycheck away from the joining the ranks of the disposable and permanently excluded, and the elderly whose fixed incomes and pensions are in danger of disappearing. 16 On a global level, the archetypes of otherness and disposability can be found in ‘disease-ridden Africa’, the Orientalist paradigm that now defines the Arab world, those geopolitical spaces that house the growing refugee camps in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and North America, and those countries from Iraq to Argentina that have suffered under neoliberal economic policies in which matters of structural adjustment are synonymous with the dictates of what Naomi Klein (2007) calls ‘disaster capitalism’. The camp increasingly becomes the exemplary institution of global neoliberal capital succinctly defined by Zygmunt Bauman (2003) as ‘garrisons of extraterritoriality’, functioning largely as ‘dumping grounds for the indisposed of and as yet unrecycled waste of the global frontier-land’ (p. 138). A bio politics that struggles in the name of democratic education and politics becomes impossible unless individual and political rights are protected and enabled by social rights. This means in part that collective opposition to the punishing state and the sovereignty of the market has to be waged in the name of a democracy that takes up the struggle for a social state that not only provides social protections and collectively endorsed insurance but also redistributes wealth and income so as to eliminate the inequalities that fuel and reproduce the power of neoliberalism and its war on the welfare state, its promotion of an expanded military, its contracting out of major public services, and its call for a law-and order state of (in)security.Bio politics as a concept in this struggle is essential because it makes visible a neoliberal regime in which politics not only makes life itself a site of radical unequal struggle, but under the power of global capital produces a politics of disposability in which exclusion and death become the only mediators of the present for an increasing number of individuals and groups. If the exclusion of vast numbers of people marginalized by race, class, age, and gender was once the secret of modernity, late modern politics has amplified its power to exclude large numbers of diverse groups from a meaningful social existence, while making the logic of disposability central to its definition of politics, and, as I have argued, its modes of entertainment. But there is something more distinctive about neoliberal bio politics and a post-9/11 world than an obsession with necropolitics, where the state of exception becomes routine, a war against terrorism mimics that which it opposes, and death-dealing modes of inequality strengthen, despite the growing modes of global resistance, the increase in humanitarian aid, the escalating call for more rights legislation, and the growing influence of international law (Comaroff, 2007, p. 207). Neoliberalism’s politics of disposability not only are maintained merely through disciplinary and regulatory powers, but also work primarily as a form of seduction, a pedagogy in which matters of subjectification, desire, and identities are central to neoliberalism’s mode of governing. Pedagogy functions as a form of cultural politics and governmentality understood as a moral and political practice that takes place in a variety sites outside of schools. In this instance, pedagogy anchors governmentality in ‘domain of cognition’ functioning largely as ‘a grid of insistent calculation, experimentation, and evaluation concerned with the conduct of conduct’ (Dillon, 1995, p. 330). But there is more at work here than the ‘domains of cognition’ that shape common sense, there is also a pedagogy of fantasy and desire producing a kind of ‘emotional habitus’ through the ever present landscapes of entertainment (Illouz, 2007). There is in this case a pedagogical apparatus and mode of seduction that in the name of entertainment invites spectators to watch an unfolding ‘theatre of cruelty’ expanding across the globe to laugh at exclusion and humiliation rather then be moved to challenge it. And it is precisely at this intersection of pedagogy and politics that neoliberalism must be challenged.

## 2nc alternative – cuba

**Something is stirring in the hearts of the oppressed!**

Alternatives are taking shape in Latin America – social revolutions empirically work, don’t push this off as idealistic – the social movement for human rights which enveloped the world gives us empirics for this argument.

**We control uniqueness – Cuba is charting a course towards creating a meaningful alternative to neoliberalism, the plan derails that**

**Huish 09 –** Simon Fraser geography PhD (Robert, “Cuba vs. Globalization: Chronicle of Anti-imperialism, Solidarity and Co-operation”, 1-27, <http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/dialogueItem.jsp?index=SN08_Huish.xml>)

There is an episode of "The Simpsons" where Homer is sent to hell, and, held captive in the ironic-punishment division, he is fed an endless quantity of donuts. But in the end, he enjoys his punishment and the devil eventually scratches his head and gives up. The ironic punishment dealt to Cuba by the Western world was exclusion from globalization with barring it from the World Trade Organization, embargoes against multi-national corporations, and forbidding "assistance" from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Now at "the end of globalism" as John Ralston Saul (2005) put it, it is Cuba, in relation to other clients of the Bank and the IMF, which has made out well from the ironic punishment. While Homer enjoyed his gluttony from his punishment, Cuba weathered its castigation by **stabilizing its economy**, improving education and health indicators, expanding its global outreach to other countries, and bolstering trade. Cuba has also taken the helm of the non-aligned movement, is a principle architect of two United Nations human rights commissions, and is **innovating** new trade and solidarity movements with other so-called "developing countries." The United States and its allies approach globalization in a certain way, and figured that excluding Cuba from it would be fitting punishment. But Cubans see globalization quite differently and act against neo-liberal benefits to their own advantage. James Wolfensohn, the former president of The Bank, stated that he thinks "Cuba has done a great job on education and health. We just have nothing to do with them in the present sense, and they should be congratulated on what they've done"(The Scotsman, 2 May 2001). Indeed the social gains Cuba has achieved on the edge of globalization are impressive in comparison to other countries in the Global South. Considering that in the early 1990s Cuba lost 87 percent of its exports and its gross domestic product (GDP) collapsed by 35 percent, many economists figured it a recipe to see the country blown off the map (Cole 1998). With the tightening of the US embargo in 1993, again in 1997, and once more in 2003, the country has managed to not just maintain, but **actively strengthen**, many of its domestic social programs. Cuba boasts the best doctor to patient ratio in the world, and its health indicators are on par with wealthy nations. Over 99 percent of the population is literate, and country's twenty-six universities do not charge tuition to nationals, all the while offering thousands of scholarships to foreigners. Compare this with neighbouring Haiti where 47 percent of people are illiterate and few Haitian's have access to the country's anemic higher education facilities (CIA 2008). Cuba's economy has grown by a steady 5 to 7 percent per year, and this is in large part thanks to its international commercial partnerships with 140 countries which have been formed under very **different conditions than neo-liberalism** (Grogg 2007). While Cuba was forced out of globalization, many countries in the South that were "invited in" have fared poorly, and the poor of those countries have fared miserably. Case by case, country by country, the story of globalization from the point of view of the destitute has seen intentional de-investment in public services in order to repay foreign debts. Restructuring economies and restructuring lives so the South exports soybeans, flowers, and peanuts but imports milk, medicine, tourists, and TV shows at extortionist prices. Although the United States is the world's most indebted country no one seems rushed to demand payments from Washington. Yet, at the turn of the millennium the Global South was repaying its foreign debt at the rate of US $250,000 per minute (Galeano 2000). In India the economy sees children stitch soccer balls rather than go to school. In Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua the export-oriented economy sees many of tomorrow's scholars go as far as grade six before setting out on a long-life of banana picking, because from the point of view of financial directors bananas are more important than public schools. In places like Haiti medical clinics are few and trained doctors fewer, loan repayments limit the imagination of financial directors to seldom invest in clinics and rarely train doctors. Within this economic climate, the 800 million souls suffering from chronic hunger are doomed to the fate of the empty plate until the free market decides to lower food prices. Neo-liberal globalization has seen development as a disaster for the poor, and a good way of maintaining inequity for the advantage of the elite. Former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin recently had enough of this and had to say something. Martin, also a former Finance Minister, business tycoon, and advisor to the IMF, said that "the rich countries cannot claim any longer that they have a moral hold on virtue" (The Globe and Mail, 21 July 2008). Martin's words are a big step towards realizing that the development discourse did not work out. As Cuba sees it, over 400 years of "development" by way of colonialism and imperialism has not turned out well for the Global South, but more recently, neo-liberalism's promise of rising livelihoods for all humanity through efficiency, technology, and communication can be thrown out for rot. Instead, in light of the continually growing global social inequality, it is well recognized that neo-liberalism was a project of moving resources, communication, and political power more securely into the hands of the elite. In considering this point of view, if we are to build a dialogue on globalization, what should we discuss? Should we build a research dialogue just for the sake of furthering knowledge? Should we envision future promises of hope through advancements in technology, communication, and the efficiency of transport? Should we continue to bear witness to the immeasurable suffering because we haven't learned to share our food, medicine, water, and dessert? Rather, shouldn't we build a dialogue on how to improve the human condition by making the world a safer place for those who suffer injustice? Some may consider this more of a political project rather than a purely academic pursuit, but if the pursuit of knowledge is done in order to improve humanity then certainly we can justify a dialogue that actively seeks to reduce social inequality as a means of improving humanity. Both Appadurai (2000) and de Sousa Santos (Santos, Nunes and Meneses 2007) said that finding commonalities in a global dialogue on globalization can be difficult thanks to rigid epistemological or institutional frameworks. However, as Paul Farmer (2003) points out, no culture is content to suffer through poverty, and overcoming the worldwide absence of badly needed resources for the poor should be seen as universal grounds to build a dialogue on how humanity has fared through globalization. If we are to pursue such a dialogue, and I think that we should, we need knowledge, experience, and idealism. We need knowledge of the apertures globalization has created for improving the human condition; specifically in how communication and technology can work to build understanding and heal injustices. We need experience of resisting the vices of inequity, and building a society where the quality of life has improved by people working to take care of other people. A great deal of development studies literature focuses on grassroots organizations and community-level initiatives, and incidentally overlooks building social capital through the public good and through the state. And here is where Cuba offers **tremendous know-how** in overcoming economic catastrophe, improving livelihoods at home and sharing its gains with those who need it the most, regardless of where in the world they are. As well, we need idealism. In this state of horrendous global inequality the thought of global health care provision, global food security, global education, and global environmental stewardship may be utopian, but it is badly needed. Neo-liberal technocracy has insisted that we look out for number one; strength lies with the ego and weakness is a symptom of solidarity. As Galeano (2000) put it, "the system feeds neither the body nor the heart: many are condemned to starve for a lack of bread and many more for a lack of embraces." Surely within globalization, as a worldwide network of communication and technology, there is room for sharing bread and time for making embraces. While Cuba was left out of the globalization project, by no means does the country dismiss the entire concept. In this paper, I highlight Cuba's approach to globalization. I discuss the ontological perspective, the social reality, and the pursuit of policy for a globalization of solidarity. In fact, Cuba's approach to globalization is one aiming to use existing tools to improve the quality of life for the poor and destitute in the Global South. It sees global networks as being vital for humanity in the twenty-first century, but it also understands that these networks have been clogged with an ideology that is dangerous for much of the world and the lived environment. I believe that by discussing Cuba's take on globalization we can build a dialogue of knowledge, experience, and idealism aimed at improving the human condition through equity, social justice, and compassion.

**Impact is extinction – developing alternatives to neoliberalism is necessary to prevent ecological collapse**

**Smith 07 –** UCLA historyPhD (Richard, “The Eco-suicidal Economics of Adam Smith”, June, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 18.2, JSTOR)

So there you have it: insatiable growth and consumption is destroying the planet and dooming humanity-but without ceaselessly growing production and insatiably rising consumption, we would be even worse off. Such is the lunatic suicidal logic of capitalist economics. Adam Smith's fatal error was his assumption that the "most effectual" means of promoting the public interest of society is to just ignore it and concentrate instead on the pursuit of economic self-interest. In the 18th century, this narcissistic economic philosophy had little impact on the natural world. Today it has a huge impact and is, moreover, totally at odds with the world's scientific bodies who are crying out for a PLAN to stop global warming and save nature. Capitalist Limits to Corporate Environmentalist!! Corporations aren't necessarily evil, but corporate managers are legally responsible to their owners, the shareholders, and not to society. This means that the critical decisions about production and resource consumption-decisions that affect our health and survival-are mainly the private prerogative of large corporations and are often only marginally under the control of governments. The blunt reality of this situation was well summed up by Joel Bakan in his recent book (and film), The Corporation: Corporations are created by law and imbued with purpose by law. Law dictates what their directors and managers can do, what they cannot do, and what they must do. And, at least in the United States and other industrialized countries, the corporation, as created by law, most closely resembles Milton Friedman's ideal model of the institution: it compels executives to prioritize the interests of their companies and shareholders above all others and forbids them from being socially responsible - at least genuinely so.38 So when corporate and societal interests conflict, even the "greenest" of corporate CEOs often have no choice but to make decisions contrary to the interests of society. British Petroleum's CEO, Lord John Browne, is good example. In the late 1990s, Browne had an environmental epiphany, broke ranks with oil industry denial, and became the first oil company executive to warn that fossil fuels are accelerating global warming. BP adopted the motto "Beyond Petroleum" in its advertisements, painted its service stations green and yellow, and bought a boutique solar power outfit. But under Browne, BP has spent far more on advertising its green credentials than it invests in actual green power production. Fully 99 percent of its investments still go into fossil fuel exploration and development, while solar power is less than 1 percent and seems to be declining. 9 In 1999, BP spent $45 million to buy the solar power outfit Solarex. By comparison, BP paid $26.8 billion to buy Amoco in order to enlarge its oil portfolio. BP's 2004 revenues topped $285 billion, while its solar power sales were just over $400 million. In February 2006, Browne told his board that the company had more than replenished its marketed output in 2005 with new proven reserves of oil and gas, and that "with more than 20 new projects due on stream in the next three years, and assuming the same level of oil price, the annual rate of increase should continue at some 4 percent through 2010."40 So, far from shifting to renewable sources of energy, BP is not only expanding its output of fossil fuels but increasing its overall reliance on fossil fuel sources of profit. BP now possesses proven reserves of 19 billion barrels produced in 23 countries, and the company currently explores for oil in 26 countries. Given the proven and stupendous profits of oil production versus the unproven profitability of alternative energy, how can Brown go "green" in any serious way and remain responsible to his owner-investors?41 Were he to do so, he would soon be out of a job.42 Ecosocialism or Collapse If we're going to stop the capitalist economic locomotive from driving us off the cliff, we are going to have to **fundamentally rethink** our entire economic life, reassert the visible hand of conscious scientific, rational economic planning, and implement democratic control over our economies and resources. We're going to have to construct an entirely different kind of economy, one that can live within its ecological means. Such an economy would have to be based around at least the following principles: An Ecosocialist Economy of Stasis First, in a world of fast-diminishing resources, a sustainable global economy can only be based on near-zero economic growth on average. That means that **to survive**, humanity will have to impose drastic fixed limits on development, resource consumption, the freedom to consume, and the freedom to pollute. Given existing global inequities and the fact that the crisis we face is overwhelmingly caused by overconsumption in the industrialized North, equity can only be achieved by imposing massive cutbacks in the advanced countries combined with a program of rational planned growth to develop the Third World, with the aim of stabilizing at zero growth on average. This will require drastically cutting back many lines of production, closing down others entirely, and creating socially and environmentally useful jobs for workers made redundant by this transition. This will also require physical rationing of many critical resources on a per capita basis for every person on the planet. **Human survival** will thus require a profound rethinking of our most fundamental ideas-bourgeois ideas-of economic freedom. For too long, many Americans, in particular, have come to identify their notion of "freedom," if not their very being and essence, with insatiable consumption-unlimited freedom of "choice" in what to buy. But 50 styles of blue jeans, 16 models of SUVs and endless choices in "consumer electronics" will all have dramatically less value when Bloomingdales is under water, Florida disappears beneath the waves, malarial mosquitos blanket Long Island beaches, and the U.S. is overrun with desperate environmental refugees from the South. Once we as a society finally admit the "inconvenient truth" that we have no choice but to drastically cut production and severely reduce consumer choice, it will also become apparent that we have to put in place a planned economy that will meet our needs and those of future generations as well as the other species with whom we share the planet. A Restructured Economy of Production for Social Need and for Use Second, we need to massively restructure the global economy. Enormous sectors in the global capitalist economy-plastics, packaging, much of the manufactured consumer electronics, petrochemical-based and other synthetic products, many pharmaceuticals, all genetically modified foods, and the vast and ever-growing production of arms-are either completely unnecessary or waste increasingly scarce resources and produce needless pollution.44 Our parents did without nearly all of this before WWII, and they were not living in caves. Many lines of production and most retail industries are built around unnecessary replacement and designed-in obsolescence. How much of the American economy from cars and appliances to clothes is purposefully designed to be "consumed, burned up, worn out, replaced, and discarded at an ever-increasing rate"46 so the cycle of waste production can begin all over again? How much of the planet's natural resources are consumed every year in completely unnecessary annual model changes, fashion updates, and "new and improved" products whose only purpose is simply to sell and sell again? If a global population of 6 to 9 billion people is going to survive this century, what choice do we have but to reorganize the global economy to conserve what shrinking natural resources we have left, reorient production for need rather than profit, design products to last as long as possible, enforce as close to total recycling as possible, and aim for as close to zero pollution as is possible? A Socialist Economic Democracy Third: an ecosocialist democracy. Endless growth or stasis? Resource exhaustion or conservation? Automobilization of the planet or enhanced public transport? Deforestation or protection of the wild forests? Agro poisons or organic farming? Hunt the fish to extinction or protect the fisheries? Raze the Amazon forest to grow MacBurgers or promote a more vegetarian diet? Manufacture products designed to be "used up, burned up, consumed as rapidly as possible" or design them to last, be repaired, recycled and also shared? Enforce private interests at the expense of the commons or subordinate private greed to the common good? In today's globalized world, decisions about such questions will determine the fate of humanity. Who can make these critical economic and moral decisions in society's interest and in the interest of preserving a habitable planet? In Adam Smith's view, which is still the operable maxim of modern capitalists and neoliberal economists, we should all just "Look out for Number 1," and the common good will take care of itself. If Smith were right, the common good would have taken care of itself long ago, and we wouldn't be facing catastrophe. After centuries of Smithian economics, the common good needs our immediate and concentrated attention. Corporations can't make such decisions in the best interests of society or the future, because their legal responsibility is to their private owners. The only way such decisions can be scientifically rational and socially responsible is when everyone who is affected participates in decision-making. And time is running out. We don't have 20 or 30 years to wait for Ford and GM to figure out how they can make a buck on electric cars. We don't have 60 or 70 years to wait while investors in coal-powered power plants milk the last profits out of those sunk investments before they consider an alternative. Humanity is at a crossroads. Either we find a way to move toward a global economic democracy in which decisions about production and consumption are directly and democratically decided by all those affected, or the alternative will be the continuing descent into a capitalist war of all-against-all over ever-diminishing resources that can only end in the collapse of what's left of civilization and the global ecology. To be sure, in an economic democracy, society would sometimes make mistakes in planning. We can't have perfect foresight, and democracies make mistakes. But at least these would be honest mistakes. The conclusion seems inescapable: **Either we democratize the economy**, construct the institutions of a practical working socialist democracy, **or we face ecological and social collapse**.

## 2nc framework (1:09)

**The role of the ballot is to determine who did the better debating – it’s not a question of fiat, just impact assessment. Debates should consider both the method and outcome of social change. This is best:**

**a. just defend the 1ac –** the K is a link turn and a mutually exclusive counterplan, if they win the plan is a good idea, they will win

**b. literature** — evidence supporting the K should shape legitimacy, not arcane abuse complaints- the lit base is objective and prevents infinite frameworks

**c. real world emulation isn’t reciprocal** – an affirmative ballot doesn’t mean the plan is passed – role playing engages in role confusion which distorts personal agency and makes passing policies impossible, vote neg on presumption – ethics discussions outweigh

**d. policy making is distorted by subjectivity – if we win a residual link to the K, it takes out the AFF because it proves the ideological underpinnings of their knowledge is inaccurate, vote neg on presumption**

**Bristow 05 –** Cardiff University economic geographer senior lecturer (Gillian, “Everyone's a ‘winner’: problematising the discourse of regional competitiveness”, Journal of Economic Geography, June, oxford journals)

This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused, narrow and ill-defined content has become so salient in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute ‘the only valid currency of argument’ (Schoenberger, 1998, 12). Whilst alternative discourses based around co-operation can be conceived (e.g. see Hines, 2000; Bunzl, 2001), they have as yet failed to make a significant impact on the dominant view that a particular, quantifiable form of output-related regional competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and ultimately beneficial. The answer appears to lie within the policy process, which refers to all aspects involved in the provision of policy direction for the work of the public sector. This therefore includes ‘the ideas which inform policy conception, the talk and work which goes into providing the formulation of policy directions, and all the talk, work and collaboration which goes into translating these into practice’ (Yeatman, 1998; p. 9). A major debate exists in the policy studies literature about the scope and limitations of reason, analysis and intelligence in policy-making—a debate which has been re-ignited with the recent emphasis upon evidence-based policy-making (see Davies et al., 2000). Keynes is often cited as the main proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he argued that policy-making should be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts (Keynes, 1971, vol. xxi, 289). However, Majone (1989) has significantly challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely objective, rational, technical assessment of policy alternatives. He has argued that in practice, policy makers use theory, knowledge and evidence **selectively** to justify policy choices which are **heavily based on value judgments**. It is thus **persuasion** (through rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their institutionalisation) that is the key to the policy process, not the logical correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is **interests** rather than ideas that shape policy making in practice. Ultimately, the language of competitiveness is the language of the business community. Thus, critical to understanding the power of the discourse is firstly, understanding the appeal and significance of the discourse to business interests and, secondly, exploring their role in influencing the ideas of regional and national policy elites.

**e. serial policy failure – accepting the frame of neoliberalism guarantees inevitable failure**

**Faber and McCarthy 03 –** Northeastern University Philanthropy and Environmental Justice Research Project (Daniel R Faber Director; Deborah McCarthy Research Associate, College of Charleston Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology. “Neo-Liberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for Ecological Democracy Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice” Pg 56-7)

As we move further into the new millennium, the mainstream US ecology movement is confronting an immense paradox. On the one hand, over the last three decades environmentalists have built one of the more broadly based and politically powerful new social movements in this country's history. As a result, US governmental policies for protecting the environment and human health are among the most stringent in the world. On the other hand, despite having won many important battles, it is becoming increasing apparent that the traditional environmental movement is losing the war for a healthy planet. With the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, globalization and the growing concentration of corporate power over all spheres of life, the ability of the movement to solve the ecological crisis is undermined. While there is no doubt that ecological problems would be much worse without the mainstream environmental movement and current system of regulation, it is also clear that the traditional strategies and policy solutions being employed are proving to be increasingly **impaired**. Most existing environmental laws are **poorly enforced** and overly limited in prescription, emphasizing, for instance, ineffectual pollution control measures which aim to limit public exposure to 'tolerable levels' of industrial toxins rather than promo ting pollution prevention measures which prohibit whole families of dangerous pollutants from being produced in the first place. In addition, other problems such as the acceleration of sprawl and the growth in US emissions of greenhouse gases continue to worsen. The US system of environmental regulation may be among the best in the world, but it is grossly inadequate for safeguarding human health and the integrity of nature. Perhaps the most critical factor for explaining the hegemony of neo-liberalism and the growing incapacity of the state to adequately address the ecological crisis is what Robert Putnam has termed the decline in social capital — those social networks and assets that facilitate the education, coordination and cooperation of citizens for mutual benefit (Putnam, 2000). Over the past generation, the social networks that integrate citizens into environmental organizations and other civic institutions have seriously deteriorated in communities across the country. The resulting decline in social capital inhibits genuine citizen participation in the affairs of civil society and engagement in the realm of politics, including the ability to tackle environmental problems in an equitable and effective fashion (Borgos and Douglas, 1996). With interactions that build mutual trust eroded, greater sectors of the populace become increasingly **cynical** of their ability to collectively effect meaningful ecological and social changes. Instead, a growing number of people retreat into what Jurgen Habermas (1975) terms civil privatism, with an emphasis on personal lifestyle issues such as career advancement, social mobility and conspicuous consumption. When social and environmental problems are confronted, increasingly individualized or 'privatized' solutions become the favoured response. As a result, the various racial, ethnic, class and religious divides in American society become accentuated, as the 'haves' increasingly disregard the needs of the ‘have nots': witness the attack on affirmative action, the social safety net, labour rights and ecological protection in favour of reduced taxes, fiscal conservatism and increasingly harsh punishments for criminal misconduct. Unfortunately, too many mainstream environmental organizations adapt corporate-like organizational models that further inhibit broad-based citizen involvement in environmental problem-solving. For these groups, citizen engagement means simply sending in membership dues, signing a petition and writing the occasional letter to a government official. As stated by William Shutkin (2000, ppl-20), there is a 'tendency for many non-profit environmental organizations to treat members as clients and consumers of services, or volunteers who help the needy, rather than as participants in the evolution of ideas and projects that forge our common life'. In the effort to conduct studies, draft legislation and organize constituencies to support passage of environment-friendly initiatives, the mainstream movement has gravitated toward a greater reliance on law and science conducted by professional experts. The aim of this move towards increased professionalization is to regain legitimacy and expert status in increasingly hostile neo-liberal policy circles. The effect, however, is to reduce internal democratic practices within some environmental organizations and state regulatory agencies. The focus on technical-rational questions, solutions and compromises, rather than issues of political power and democratic decision-making, is causing a **decline in public interest** and participation in national environmental politics (Faber and O'Connor, 1993)./

**Two implications if we win framework:**

**a. dismiss permutations –** they have to justify their 1ac world view and can’t sever representations, that’s best for ground and education because it prevents AFF conditionality and debate is an academic activity

**b. they can’t weigh the AFF** – the stasis point has shifted away from whether or not the alternative resolves 1ac impacts to whether or not the 1ac’s stance of perpetuating neoliberal social relations in Latin America is good – if it’s bad you reject the AFF because the plan responds to a poorly constructed and dangerous model of the world

### App

Heg unsus – takes out multilat

### Shun

No d rule

### 2NC Inevitable

**Warming’s inevitable—that’s Dickinson—new study by multiple climatologists proves that even if all emissions were cut today the effects would persist for a thousand years—the aff has no chance of solving**

**Answer was happening fast-not resp – cant so**

**Their reduction in warming is infinitesimal**

**Lomborg 8** – adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School (Bjørn, 9/30, Global warming: why cut one 3,000th of a degree?, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest\_contributors/article4849167.ece, AG)

Many of the proffered global warming policies are designed to help politicians bathe in the warm glow of good intentions, with little or no regard to the mounting costs and infinitesimal benefits. It is a well-rehearsed point that the Kyoto Protocol was a terribly inefficient, hugely costly way to do virtually no good. Even if every industrialised country, including the United States, had accepted the protocol, and everyone had lived up to its requirements for the entire century, it would have had virtually no impact, even a hundred years from now. It would reduce the global temperature increase by an immeasurable 0.15C by the year 2100. The cost of implementing Kyoto, taking the average figure from the various top macroeconomic models, would have been almost £100 billion annually for the rest of the century. The US declined to sign up to Kyoto and many countries, including Spain, Japan, Canada, and Greece, have had a hard time living up to their pledges. It is likely that the total reduction in carbon emissions will be less than 5 per cent of what Kyoto promised. Yet the EU and others advocate that Kyoto-style policies are still right, only that much more than Kyoto is needed. The EU has promised to cut its emissions by 20 per cent by 2020, through a 20 per cent increase in renewables. There seems to be no better reason for this decision than that 20 and 20 in 2020 sounds good. Gordon Brown has wholeheartedly backed the plan, which includes making a dramatic increase in renewables - mainly 3,500 wind turbines in the North Sea. The British Government estimates the cumulative carbon saving from all its plans at somewhere between 950 and 1,100 million tonnes of CO2 by 2030. The Department for Business will not give a figure beyond that timeframe but, given that wind turbines have a lifetime of about two decades, this seems the relevant cumulative reduction given the investment. The department confirms that the total investment from public and private sources into renewables will be about £100 billion. **Computer modelling** - using DICE (dynamic integrated model of climate and the economy) - **shows** that the net effect of the UK renewables effort is impossibly tiny. The temperature increase by 2100 without Mr Brown's plan would have been 2.4536181C. With the best-case scenario the huge UK effort means that the temperature at the end of the century would be 2.4532342C. **The effect is a difference of** about 0.00038C - or about **one three-thousandth of a degree in a hundred years**. This is the equivalent of delaying the temperature increase by the end of the century by a little less than a week.

**Oceans make it inevitable**

**Stern 7** Nicholas Stern—Head of the British Government Economic Service—2007 (Former Head Economist for the World Bank, I.G. Patel Chair at the London School of Economics and Political Science, “The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review”, The report of a team commissioned by the British Government to study the economics of climate change led by Siobhan Peters, Head of G8 and International Climate Change Policy Unit, Cambridge University Press, p. 11-13)

Additional warming is already in the pipeline due to past and present emissions. The full warming effect of past emissions is yet to be realised. Observations show that the oceans have taken up around 84% of the total heating of the Earth’s system over the last 40 years36. If global emissions were stopped today, some of this heat would be exchanged with the atmosphere as the system came back into equilibrium, causing an additional warming. Climate models project that the world is committed to a further warming of 0.5° - 1 °C over several decades due to past emissions37.

### 2NC Bio-D—No Impact

**No impact to the environment—that’s Easterbrook, Strossel and Doremus—Humans can empirically survive—we can adapt to any environment—Err neg**

**A) Empirically denied—99% of species have already gone extinct**

**B) Media alarmism taints their evidence—it’s their burden to prove it’s not**

**C) Their evidence doesn’t assume redundancy—more-adaptable species fill in to provide lost ecosystem functions**

**D) Human ingenuity—the free market will fill in and develop technology, conservation practices are occurring now—we control uniqueness, the environment is improving**

**No exp**

**Answer all warr**

**E) Prefer our hard studies**

**Washington Post 97** (8/29, Three Studies Show Diversity Can't Guarantee Ecosystem Strength, http://www-tech.mit.edu/V117/N38/shorts2.38w.html, AG)

Ecologists have long maintained that diversity is one of nature's greatest strengths, but new research suggests that diversity alone does not guarantee strong ecosystems. In findings that could intensify the national debate over endangered species and habitat conservation, three new studies suggest a greater abundance of plant and animal varieties doesn't always translate to better ecological health. At least equally important, the research found, are the types of species and how they interact. Separate experiments in California, Minnesota and Sweden, found that diversity often had little bearing on the performance of ecosystems - at least as measured by the growth and health of native plants. In fact, the communities with the greatest biological richness were often the poorest in terms of productivity and nutrient cycling. One study compared plant life on 50 remote islands in northern Sweden that are prone to frequent wildfires from lightning strikes. Scientist David Wardle of Landcare Research in Lincoln, New Zealand, and colleagues at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences found that islands dominated by few species of plants recovered more quickly than nearby islands with more biological diversity. Similar findings were reported by University of Minnesota researchers who studied savannah grasses, and by Stanford's Vitousek and colleague David Hooper, who concluded that functional characteristics of plant species were more important than the number of varieties in determining how ecosystems performed.

**F) Bad studies—their evidence is anecdotal, empirically denied, and tainted by moral tunnel vision—there is no scenario for complete collapse**

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The low resilience assumption

Advocates of the conservation of biodiversity tend not to acknowledge the distinction between resilient and sensitive ES. This ‘low resilience assumption’ gives rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim within the conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity.

An extreme example of this claim is made by the Ehrlichs in Extinction. They state that “all [ecosystem services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to increase” then observe that attempts to artificially replicate natural processes “are no more than partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. When society sacrifices natural services for some other gain… it must pay the costs of substitution” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1982, pp. 95–96). This assertion—that the only alternative to protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted by artificial alternatives—is an extreme example of the ‘low resilience assumption’. Paul Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 1997 i nhis response (with four co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark Sagoff regarding economic arguments for species conservation (Ehrlich et al. 1997, p. 101).

The claim that ES depend on biodiversity is also notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Naeem et al. 1999) that sparked the debate mentioned in the introduction. This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field (e.g., Hector et al. 2001; Lawler et al. 2002; Lyons et al. 2005). Although such authors may not actually articulate the low resilience assumption, presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification indicates its influence.

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’, which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation:

Have there been permanent and significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192)

Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all” and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is uncommon but not unheard of (e.g., Tudge 1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001).

The low resilience assumption is also undermined by the overwhelming tendency for the protection of specific endangered species to be justified by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to the necessity of conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasising the actual ES these species provide or might be able to provide humanity. Often the only services that can be promoted in this regard relate to the ‘scientific’ or ‘cultural’ value of conserving a particular species, and the tourism revenue that might be associated with its continued existence. The preservation of such services is of an entirely different order compared with the collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic environmental authors.

The popularity of the low resilience assumption is in part explained by the increased rhetorical force of arguments that highlight connections between the conservation of biodiversity, human survival and economic profit. However, it needs to be acknowledged by those who employ this approach that a number of negative implications are associated with any use of economic arguments to justify the conservation of biodiversity